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CHAPTER ONE 
 
1. Introduction: Transitional justice and Human Rights 
If it is granted that it is the government’s responsibility to promote national unity and 
reconciliation, what exactly are its obligations according to international law with respect to 
human rights violations?1 A question debated by most scholars of Transitional Justice is, 
what mechanism can be successfully used to heal and reconcile a nation after it has survived 
a repressive regime. The mechanisms available include prosecutions, reparations, justice 
reforms, truth commissions2 or general amnesties.3  
 
 In order to progress towards a peaceful future to be shared by victims and abusers of a post 
conflict society, the international human rights community has supported truth commissions 
as an important part of the healing and peace process.4 Truth Commissions correspond to 
state obligations under international human rights law in which states implement their 
obligation to investigate and identify perpetrators of serious human rights violations and their 
victims.5 This obligation corresponds with an individual right, namely, the right to truth.6 
  
There are other mechanisms that can be used to transform a society from conflict to peace. In 
spite of this, truth commissions seem to have gained popularity with each passing year.7 The 
reason why truth commissions have become popular includes, that in order to overcome the 
                                                            
1 Rwelamira, M in Rwelamira, M and Werle, G (eds) Confronting Past Injustices (2006) xix. 
2 Freeman, M Truth Commissions and Procedural Fairness (2006) 5. 
3 Boraine, A “Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: The Third Way” in Rotberg, R and Thompson, D (eds) 
Truth v Justice (2000) 143. 
4 Brahm, E “Truth Commissions” (2004) Available at 
http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/truth_commissions/ (Accessed on 29 April 2009). 
5 Freeman op cit 6. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Mani, R “Does Power Trump Morality?” in Hughes, E, Schabas, W and Thakur, R (eds) Atrocities and 
International Accountability: Beyond transitional justice (2007) 33. 
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anguish of the past, the truth needs to be told. Families of victims and the surviving victims 
of gross human rights violations have a right to know the truth and want the truth concerning 
such violations to be heard. In addition, often in post conflict societies, the number of cases 
might exceed the capacity of the new regime to investigate and prosecute the perpetrators.  
Even though truth commissions are strongly supported as an alternative mechanism to 
prosecutions, reparations and blanket amnesties, the question lingers as to how successful 
truth commissions have been when dealing with gross human right violations.  
 
The significance of this study will be to determine whether a truth commission is an effective 
mechanism to deal with grave breaches of human rights and what role it plays in Transitional 
Justice. It will also determine and establish whether truth commissions have been successful 
or not. The criteria success of the truth commissions will be based will be on how best the 
truth commissions acted out their duties in terms of their mandate, how best they investigated 
the violations of human rights and how the process of such investigations were conducted in 
terms of human rights violations. The success will also depend on the outcome of the 
hearings, if any, arising from the investigations and the findings made by the truth 
commission including recommendations flowing there from. The recommendations will 
depend on the nature, extent and the implementation of amnesty, reparations and 
prosecutions. Success will also be based on the outcome of the truth commission process in 
terms of its contribution to the reconciliation and transformation of a society. It is important 
to note that all these factors will depend on the situation within each country. Most 
importantly, success of the truth commissions will be evaluated by determining whether 
society as a whole was of the view that the process of the truth commission satisfied the need 
for transitional justice. This study will also clarify how important mechanisms such as truth 
commissions are and what relevance they should have in the future.  
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A problem which arises is, if truth commissions are less successful than anticipated, should 
countries rather attempt a new strategy or make use of alternative mechanism such as 
prosecutions or amnesties, in dealing with human rights violations effectively? And even if 
unsuccessful, do the advantages of a truth commission such as truth outweigh the need to 
receive justice for gross human rights violation? For this reason, this issue is worthy of 
investigation. Since a truth commission is the most popular mechanism of transitioning 
societies, it is of great importance to Transitional Justice that it be determined whether they 
work in terms of human rights violations. In addition, this research paper will also highlight 
which were the successful truth commissions that are paving the way for the future.  
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CHAPTER TWO  
 
2. Amnesties, Prosecutions and Reparations 
Any assessment of truth commissions must involve comparisons between them and the 
alternate approaches which may be used to deal with gross human rights violations.8  
Alternate approaches may include granting amnesty or prosecuting those responsible for 
committing gross human rights violations.9 These approaches are thus worthy of discussion. 
 
2.1 Amnesty 
Amnesty is an exercise of sovereign power by a state.10 The question of amnesty has often 
been debated. Marxen defines amnesty by identifying four main characteristics:11  
1. An amnesty grants a reduction or complete exemption from punishment; 
2. Amnesty involves an undefined number of cases as opposed to an individual pardon; 
3. Amnesty may be granted to avoid prosecution, to quash a pending case or to prevent 
the execution of a judgement which has already been passed; 
4. The exemption of punishment created by amnesty is of a lesser legal quality. The 
amnesty does not cancel out the criminal act. It only waives the consequences of the 
punishable offence. 
 
The effect of amnesty is that national amnesty legislation has an effect only within the 
jurisdiction of the state that enacted it.12 This would entail that where jurisdiction is universal, 
                                                            
8 Steiner, H in Truth Commissions: A Comparative Assessment Human Rights Program Harvard Law School 
(1997) 10. 
9 See also Steiner ibid. 
10 Kallon v Kamara SCSL (2004) 15 AR72(E) at para 67.  
11 Marxen, K “Punishment and indemnity for violation of human rights” in Rwelamira, M and Werle, G (eds) 
Confronting Past Injustices (2006) 34. 
12 Fernandez, L Transitional Justice Class Notes - Transnational Justice and Crime Prevention (2009). 
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the amnesty does not prevent the person granted amnesty from being prosecuted by other 
states.13 However, if the amnesty results from a broad societal consensus, other states should 
refrain from prosecuting.14  
 
The legal position regarding amnesties under international law often depends on the nature of 
the crime committed.15 Amnesties are often frowned upon if they have the power to grant 
amnesty for crimes deemed to be international crimes, which states are under a duty to 
prosecute or extradite.16  General amnesties are therefore unacceptable.17 Amnesties granted 
in past countries in transition, were made with reference to “political crimes”, “military 
crimes” or “crimes against the state.”18 A prime example would be the amnesty granted by 
South Africa, which was for crimes “associated with a political objective.”19   
 
An amnesty may have a negative effect on the work of a truth commission. Victims and 
relatives of past abuses have often argued that the granting of amnesty obstructs peaceful and 
sustained reconciliation.20 This impacts the objectives and aims of a truth commission. In 
addition, self-amnesty laws granted in counties like Chile,21 may also have a negative impact 
on a truth commission as it prevents the commission from exercising their power in terms of 
determining the whole truth.  
 
                                                            
13 ibid. 
14 ibid. 
15 McDonald, A “A right to truth, justice and a remedy for African victims of serious violations of international 
humanitarian law” in Law, Democracy and Development (1999) 3 Journal of the Faculty of Law of the 
University of the Western Cape 139 at 154. 
16 Sarkin, J “The Amnesty Hearings in South Africa Revisited” in Werle, G Justice in Transition – Prosecution 
and Amnesty in Germany and South Africa (2006) 43. 
17 Werle, G Principles of International Criminal Law (2005) 65.  
18 McDonald op cit 157. 
19 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 Republic of South Africa Section 18 (1). 
20 Rwelamira op cit  8. 
21 McDonald op cit 163. 
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However, a “truth for amnesty” in my view may be extremely advantageous. This is based on 
the premise that granting amnesty in exchange for truth may result in further facts from the 
perpetrators perspective, being revealed. It can encourage perpetrators to come forward. 
 
 
2.2 Prosecution 
Impunity has been the norm for serious violations of national law and international law.22 
Therefore, prosecutions form one of the key elements of an integrated transitional justice 
strategy, aimed at moving a society “beyond impunity and beyond a legacy of human rights 
abuse.”23  
 
The purpose for prosecuting gross human rights violations is to communicate to citizens a 
“disapproval of violations and support for certain democratic values.”24 Trials can help 
differentiate between conduct that is condoned and conduct that is condemned by the State, 
which as the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights states, 
contributes to the public’s trust in State institutions.25   
 
Whether the public places its trust in truth commissions is debatable. Victims of gross human 
rights violations would expect the perpetrators to be held accountable in some form. If this 
accountability is lacking by a Truth Commission, there will be a lack of public trust.  
                                                            
22 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights: “Rule-of-Law Tools for Post-Conflict 
States: Prosecution Initiatives” (2006) HR/PUB/06/4 1 Available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/46cebb6c2.html [accessed 1 September 2009] (Accessed on 21 April 
2009). 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid 4. 
25 Ibid.  
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A duty to prosecute does however exist. Werle states that crimes under international law are 
directed against the international community as a whole.26 The international community is 
therefore empowered to prosecute and punish these crimes.27 International law allows and 
even obligates the international community and states to prosecute international crimes 
through universal jurisdiction.28 This obligation is also recognized by treaty law and 
customary international law on the state where the international crime took place.29  
 
Prosecutions may not always be an appropriate mechanism. In situations where the number of 
alleged perpetrators exceeds the capacity of the justice systems, truth commissions may be 
seen as another way of delivering justice30. 
 
Even though many truth commissions list accountability as an aim, others specifically avoid 
it by offering amnesty.31 It should be noted that in terms of truth commissions, accountability 
is not an essential element of the truth-seeking process.32 However, some may argue that 
without accountability, truth produces only injustice.33  
 
Contrary to this, truth commissions are, in comparison to courts, better than trials at 
gathering, investigating and publishing information about the previous regime.34 While they 
are not usually capable of establishing criminal culpability or imposing punishment, they can 
                                                            
26 Werle op cit 58. 
27 Ibid.  
28 Ibid 61. 
29 Ibid 62. 
30 Bussman, H “The South African Approach – The Truth and Reconciliation Commission and Amnesty for 
Gross Human Rights Violations” in Werle, G Justice in Transition – Prosecution and Amnesty in Germany and 
South Africa (2006) 42. 
31 Daly, E “Truth Skepticism: An Inquiry into the Value of Truth in Times of Transition” (2008) 2 The 
International Journal of Transitional Justice 23 at 34 Available at http://ijtj.oxfordjournals.org (Accessed on 29 
April 2009). 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
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illustrate the factual and moral responsibility of the perpetrators.35 In addition, when a truth 
commission names the perpetrators responsible in its report, it paves the way for the criminal 
prosecution of those perpetrators.36  
 
2.3 Reparations 
Reparation is an important tool of transitional justice37 and comprises restitution, 
compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition.38  The aim of 
reparation is to eliminate, as far as possible, the consequences of the illegal act and to restore 
the situation that would have existed if the act had not been committed.39  
 
Among states, the principle that every violation of international obligations gives rise to a 
duty to make reparation is well established in law but with regard to individual victims of 
violations of human rights law and international humanitarian law, the position is more 
uncertain.40 
 
Truth commissions play a role in recognizing the right to reparations and in awarding 
reparation orders.41 This is done by recommending reparation programs to be established for 
victims in their reports. In Chile, the recommendation on reparation was implemented by way 
of the establishment of the National Corporation for Reparation and Reconciliation to oversee 
                                                            
35 Ibid 35. 
36 Ibid 36. 
37 Freeman op cit 62. 
38Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of 
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law (hereafter Basic 
Principles and Guidelines) Adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 60/147 of 16 December 
2005 Sections 19, 20, 21,22, 23 respectively.  
39 Gillard, E “Reparations for Violations of International Humanitarian Law” (2003)  85 International Review of 
the Red Cross 529 at 531 Available at  
http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/5SRLFZ/$File/irrc_851_Gillard.pdf (Accessed 5 May 2009) 
40 Ibid. 
41 De Feyter and Parmentier,S “Introduction” in De Feyter et al (eds) Out of the Ashes: Reparation for Victims 
of Gross and Systematic Human Rights Violations (2005)  1. 
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reparations to victims.42 This may not be the case in other countries due to either a lack of 
resources or lack of political will on part of the governments to implement such reparations. 
Reparations play an important role in truth commissions by giving the victims or their 
relatives a form of compensation for their suffering.   
 
These mechanisms illustrate all the elements which a truth commission may encompass. For 
this reason, truth commissions may be seen as the middle road between the above-mentioned 
mechanisms. This is in my view ideal for countries in transition where gross human rights 
violations have occurred. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
42 Hayner, P “Fifteen Truth Commissions – 1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study” (1994) 16 Human Rights 
Quarterly 597 at 622. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
3. The Importance of Truth and Reconciliation 
 
In this chapter, the importance of truth and reconciliation will be discussed. It is crucial to 
understand these principles of truth commissions and how truth and reconciliation correlate. 
  
3.1 Truth 
In her book Unspeakable Truths,43 Priscilla Hayner begins by asking “Do you want to 
remember, or to forget?”44 If we choose to remember, the opportunity arises to determine the 
truth.  
 
In many societies where there has been an abusive rule, there have been secret 
disappearances, murders and other serious human rights violations. The victims of such 
abuses and their families want to know and deserve to know the truth as to how and why the 
violation took place.  
 
The truth in my opinion serves three purposes. Firstly, for the victims, the truth can give 
closure and heal their pain; secondly, for the perpetrators, the truth can ease their guilt; and 
thirdly, for the society, the truth will help them understand the reasons why the violations 
were committed to ensure that they will never be committed again.45  
 
                                                            
43 Hayner, P Unspeakable Truths: Facing the Challenge of Truth Commissions (2002). 
44 Ibid 1. 
45 Amnesty International “Truth Commissions” Available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/international-
justice/issues/truth-commissions (Accessed on 29 April 2009). 
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In addition, the truth can bring about unity and reconciliation to a society after surviving 
abusive rule. Either way, in order for a society to make the “transition” the truth needs to be 
told. A truth commission is a vehicle for truth telling.46 Truth-telling is often seen as the first 
step in the process of achieving justice and reconciliation on an individual level.47 Thus, truth 
commissions serve the purpose of being an instrument for victims and perpetrators alike to 
exercise their right to truth and the opportunity to be heard.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
46 Mobekk, E “Transitional Justice in Post-Conflict Societies – Approaches to Reconciliation” (2005) 267. 
Available at http://www.bmlv.gv.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/10_wg12_psm_100.pdf  (Accessed on 21 April 
2009). 
47 Ibid 272. 
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3.2 Reconciliation 
Reconciliation implies rebuilding relationships today that are not tainted by the conflicts and 
hatred of yesterday.48  
 
Truth commissions have the objective of reconciliation after the facts have been revealed.49  
The purpose of any Transitional Justice mechanism is to reunite the people afflicted by past 
conflict. The purpose is to contribute to reconciling them. Reconciliation represents the 
bridge between peace and justice, and between past and future.50 
 
According to Werle, South Africa’s message to societies in transition is that there is no 
reconciliation without truth.51  The fact that the truth is seen as a fundamental and central 
component of reconciliation can nevertheless be disputed.52 Some writers are of the opinion 
that truth finding may reveal feelings of resentment, hatred and open old wounds.53   
 
I agree that truth is required to reach reconciliation. With the truth comes forgiveness, and 
only when we forgive can we reunite. Thus, we need to look at society holistically and create 
processes that would “reconcile” such society as a whole. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
48 Hayner Unspeakable Truths op cit 161.  
49 Baehr, P “How to Come to Terms with the Past” in Hughes, E, Schabas, W and Thakur, R (eds)  Atrocities 
and International Accountability (2007) 15. 
50 Mani op cit 39. 
51 Werle, G “Without Truth, No Reconciliation: The South African Rechtsstaat and The Apartheid Past” (1996) 
29 Verfassung und Recht in Ubersee 58 at 72. 
52 Mani op cit 34. 
53 Baehr op cit 18. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
4. Truth Commissions 
Truth commissions have become a familiar concept and institution for a state emerging from 
a period of gross human rights abuses.54 They are usually set up during or immediately after a 
political transition in a country,55 similar to a change of regime.   
 
Up until 2007, 32 truth commissions had been established in over 28 countries56 with the first 
truth commission in Uganda in 1974.57 The five significant commissions are the South 
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission,58 the Chilean National Commission on Truth 
and Reconciliation,59 the Guatemalan Historical Clarification Commission,60 the Commission 
on the Truth for El Salvador and the National Commission on the Disappearance of 
Persons.61  
 
A truth commission is a fact finding body set up specifically to investigate and record serious 
violations of human rights,62 uncover the much needed truth and make recommendations for 
redress and future prevention of abuses.63 Truth commissions are aimed at bringing about 
peace and reconciliation in a divided society ravaged by conflict. They are created in various 
ways. In some cases, truth commissions were reached through negotiated settlements 
                                                            
54 Steiner op cit 7. 
55 Hayner, P “Fifteen Truth Commissions” op cit 608.  
56 Amnesty International op cit. 
57 As noted by Hayner “Fifteen Truth Commissions” op cit 598. 
58 Hereafter the South African TRC. 
59 Hereafter the Chilean TRC. 
60 Hereafter the Guatemalan CEH. This abbreviation is given by Tomuschat, C “Clarification Commission in 
Guatemala” (2001) 23 Human Rights Quarterly 233. 
61 This is according to Priscilla Hayner. See Hayner Unspeakable Truths op cit 32. 
62 Buergenthal, T “Truth Commissions: Due Process and Functions” in Dupuy et al Festschrift fur Tomuschat 
(2006) 104. 
63 Freeman op cit 18. 
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between the former repressive regime and the new government. This was the case with the 
South African TRC.64  
 
Hayner refers to truth commissions as bodies that, share a focus on the past, investigate past 
patterns of abuses, are temporary bodies, are officially sanctioned, authorised or empowered 
by the state, and complete their work by submitting a report.65   
 
She also writes that truth commissions may have any or all of the following five basic aims: 
to clarify and formally acknowledge past abuses; to respond to the specific needs of the 
victims; to contribute to justice and accountability; to outline institutional responsibility and 
recommend reforms; and/or to promote reconciliation and reduce conflict over the past.66  
Therefore in order to reach this goal, testimony from victims or perpetrators, depending on 
the structure of the truth commission, is important.67  
 
Once the truth commission has completed its investigations, held hearings and collected 
evidence, it can give recommendations in its report for broad reforms of state institutions, 
based on its findings.68   
 
It is important to note that no two truth commissions function in the same. They differ in 
terms of the mandate, which may range from the duration of their operation, the time period 
they focus upon, and the types of crimes constituting their investigation.69 It is often stressed 
                                                            
64 Hayner Unspeakable Truths op cit 41. 
65 ibid 14. 
66 ibid 24. 
67 Fernandez op cit. 
68 Mobekk op cit 266 - 267. 
69 Brahm op cit. 
 
 
 
 
16 
 
that truth commissions do not replace judicial bodies and that they are not courts,70 however, 
the truth commissions may possess similar powers to judicial bodies. These powers, which 
are also covered in the mandates, include the power to subpoena, the power to issue warrants 
or the power to order seizure of evidence.71 Truth commissions may also differ in terms of 
holding public or private hearings, granting amnesty or disclosing the perpetrators 
responsible. This differentiation depends on the conflict that occurred in a specific society 
and therefore there are different purposes for each truth commissions.  
 
In spite of the fact that truth commissions are becoming popular, not all truth commissions 
are genuinely implemented, such as that of Uganda in 1974, which instead of trying to rectify 
the past, seemed only intended to satisfy international pressure.72 Not every truth commission 
achieved what it was intended to. Each had its advantages and disadvantages. And not all 
succeeded in dealing with human rights violations, let alone succeeded in terms of their 
mandate.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
70 Freeman op cit 69. 
71 Fernandez op cit. 
72 Brahm op cit.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
5. The Successful and Unsuccessful – An Evaluation on Truth Commissions 
The success of truth commissions will be based on the following commissions adopted by the 
following countries: South Africa (1995), Chile (1990), Guatemala (1997), Sierra Leone 
(2002), Argentina (1983) and El Salvador (1992).73 
 
5.1 ARGENTINA- National Commission on the Disappeared 
 
The military coup that brought General Jorge Videla to power in Argentina in 1976 led to an 
increase in activities by “right wing death squads and by left wing guerrilla movements.”74 
During their rule, the military government initiated a program of brutal repression against the 
opposition.75 At the hands of the military, an estimated 10 000 to 30 000 people were 
tortured, killed, arrested and disappeared.76 The military went on to rule Argentina for seven 
years after it had seized power.77 Toward the end of their rule, the military lost the war 
against Great Britain over the Falkland Islands, and this prompted them to agree to an 
election and a civilian rule in 1983.78 However, just before relinquishing power, the military 
granted themselves immunity from prosecution.79  
 
With the military was ousted from power, Argentina began to transform itself into a 
democracy and looked for a way of creating a commission to investigate the gross human 
                                                            
73 See Appendix 1 – Table of Truth Commissions in Freeman op cit 317 – 325. 
74 Sikkink, K and Walling, C “Argentina’s contribution to global trends in transitional justice” in Roht-Arriaza, 
N and Mariezcurrena, J (eds) Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First Century (2006) 304. 
75 Ibid.  
76 Hayner Unspeakable Truths op cit 33. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid.  
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rights atrocities perpetrated by the Argentine military regime between 1976 and 1983.80 Raul 
Alfonsin, the newly elected president, created the “National Commission on the 
Disappeared”81 (CONADEP) through a presidential decree within a week of taking office.82   
 
The Commission consisted of ten commission members and was headed by the well-known 
and respected author Ernesto Sabato.83 The non-governmental organisations had initially 
lobbied for a parliamentary commission and not a presidentially appointed commission 
because the latter lacked the power to compel the production of information from the military 
institutions.84  The Commission also had no powers of subpoena.85 
 
The Commission was mandated to ‘clarify the acts related to the disappearance of persons’ 
and also to determine, where possible, the location of their remains.86 During the 
investigations, many human rights organisations handed over an extensive number of files 
relating to the disappeared.87 The Commission inspected detention centres, police facilities 
and secret cemeteries.88 Testimony was taken only from families of the disappeared, those 
who survived temporary disappearance and those who were witness to others being 
imprisoned.89 Statements were taken in embassies and consulates of Argentina around the 
world and people in exile returned to give testimony to assist in the investigations.90 The 
Commission also worked closely with the families of the disappeared to try and find persons 
                                                            
80 Hayner “Fifteen Truth Commissions” op cit 615.  
81 Comision Nacional para la Desaparicon de Personas.  
82 Hayner Unspeakable Truths op cit 33. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid 33 – 34. 
85 Ibid 109. 
86 Ibid 316. 
87 Hayner “Fifteen Truth Commissions” op cit 615. 
88 Hayner Unspeakable Truths op cit 34. 
89 Ibid 175. 
90 Ibid 34.  
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who might have been alive at the time.91 It must be noted, however, that the Commission had 
no capacity to undertake in-depth investigation into individual cases.92 
 
The Commission did not hold public hearings.93 It received over 7 000 statements during nine 
months.94  1 500 people who survived the military’s detention camps gave detailed 
descriptions of the camps and what kinds of torture were used.95 The investigations also 
focused on detention and torture camps and often visited these camps with survivors to 
confirm the location of these camps.96   
 
As confirmed by non-governmental organisations, the Commission received hardly any 
information it had requested from the military forces.97  
 
After nine months of investigations, the Commission presented its final report called Nunca 
Mas (English – Never Again).98 The report documented that 8 960 people had disappeared99 
and that most of the disappeared were eventually killed and their bodies were either 
incinerated, buried or thrown into the sea.100 It is also estimated that over 9 000 people were 
killed and that the bulk of these murders occurred during 1976 and 1977.101 The report also 
included a list of 365 “former torture centres” accompanied by photographs.102  The report 
                                                            
91 Ibid.  
92 Ibid 109. 
93 Ibid 34. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid 34. 
98 See Hayner Unspeakable Truths ibid.  
99 Ibid. 
100 Sikkink and Walling op cit 304. See also Nunca Mas: The Report of the Argentine National Commission on 
the Disappeared 209 – 234. 
101 Ibid.  
102 Hayner Unspeakable Truths op cit 34. 
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was well received and was published into a book, which went on to become a national best-
seller.103  
 
The “self-amnesty” that was granted by the military government was soon repealed by the 
new government.104 Following this, the Commission handed over its files directly to the state 
prosecutor’s office.105  The files gave the prosecutors access to a large number of primary 
witnesses and allowed the prosecutors to build up cases quickly.106 All the information 
collected by the Commission was essential in the trial of senior members of the military 
juntas, which resulted in the conviction of five generals.107 The most important general 
convicted was General Videla, who was sentenced to life imprisonment.108 However, when 
the trials against junior officers began, the Argentine military carried out various coup 
attempts against the Alfonsin government.109 The government was then led to decree two 
laws which were basically amnesty laws known as the Full Stop Law and the Due Obedience 
Law.110  
 
These amnesty laws did not reverse or overturn previous trials, but blocked the possibility of 
more trials.111 The government of Carlos Menem, which followed the government of 
Alfonsin, also offered a pardon to those military in prison.112 However, the pardons did not 
reverse their trials or sentences.113  
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A reparations law was put in place 10 years after the Nunca Mas was published.114 The 8 960 
files of the disappeared served as the heart of the reparations program which was set up to 
reach families of the disappeared.115 This reparations program was very inclusive.116 
Monetary reparations117 were given to majority of families of the disappeared,118 political 
prisoners119 and those who were forced into exile after arrest.120  
 
A key innovation in Argentina was the creation of “truth trials.”121 This came about after the 
amnesty laws blocked trials for many past gross human rights violations.122 Judges were 
encouraged to develop trials that would assist in determining the truth about the fate and 
whereabouts of the disappeared.123 The Centre of Legal and Social Studies (CLSS) argued 
that the families of the disappeared had a “right to truth” and to pursue that right through 
judicial investigations.124 Truth trials were eventually established as a judicial process in 
1998.125 It incorporated elements from both truth commissions and criminal justice.126  
 
The CLSS’s greatest challenge was having the amnesty laws declared null and void in 
court.127 Other human rights activists also worked for many years at getting the “amnesty 
laws repealed, annulled or declared unconstitutional.”128 
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Eventually, the Supreme Court, in a majority judgement, declared the amnesty laws unlawful 
in 2005.129 In addition, in 2003, the Argentine Congress, with support from new government 
of Nestor Kirchner, passed a law that declared the Full Stop and Due Obedience Laws null 
and void.130 
 
Today, it is suggested that Argentina is in the process of permitting the blocked human rights 
trials to proceed.131  
 
The truth commission in Argentina was the first important truth commission in the world 
because it provided a model for all subsequent truth commissions.132 It made use of many 
transitional justice mechanisms that included trials and reparations.133 It was set apart from 
other truth commissions because it held “near-immediate trials” of top leaders for their 
human rights abuses.134 The Argentine model suggested that truth commissions and trials can 
be beneficially combined.135 It also, amidst two controversial amnesty laws, enacted laws that 
permitted the reopening of blocked human rights cases. 
 
However, a flaw of this Commission was that it was only limited to nine months for 
investigations. Had the investigators had more time, they would have been able to receive 
more testimonies136 which would have been effective. More time awarded to the mandate 
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would have led to more healing for the society.137 But with the assistance of the human rights 
organisations and the society, the Commission accomplished in getting the government’s 
acknowledgement in its involvement in past atrocities.138 
 
The Argentine model may not have been perfect regarding reconciliation and the 
investigations may have been limited, but it encompassed all elements necessary to deal with 
gross human rights violations. Argentina was therefore successful in dealing with gross 
human rights abuses. It should be looked at as an example that truth and justice can be 
successfully achieved.  
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5.2 CHILE - National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation 
 
In September 1973, General Augusto Pinochet overthrew the democratically elected 
government of Salvador Allende, the then president of the civilian government of Chile.139 
He brutally repressed every opponent and continued to rule in Chile for 17 years.140 Under 
Pinochet’s rule political differences were “resolved through a systematic policy which 
involved police brutality, censorship, exile, torture, disappearances and executions.”141 
During his rule, Pinochet instituted an amnesty law in 1978.142 This law covered all crimes 
against persons committed between 11 September 1973 and 10 March 1978, and included 
serious crimes such as murder and kidnapping.143 It was widely criticised as a self-amnesty 
law.144  
 
As specified by the Constitution which was designed by the military145, presidential elections 
were held in 1990.146 Chile returned to democratic government when President Patricio 
Aylwin was elected to power.147 President Aylwin, however, assumed presidency with certain 
restrictions on democratic rule.148 One restriction was that Pinochet remained head of the 
army and that the military structure remains intact.149 In relation to the transition which was 
ahead of Chile, the Aylwin government “apparently assumed” that an aggressive attitude 
regarding human rights violations would provoke clashes with the armed forces “that might 
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jeapordise the success of the transition itself.”150 However, there was a sincere desire by the 
new government to seek out the truth, apply justice and also provide reparations to the 
victims who suffered violations.151  
 
Another restriction which faced President Aylwin was the amnesty law.152 The amnesty 
constrained options for dealing with the abuses owing to the Pinochet regime.153 However, 
amnesty does not prevent the investigation of facts.154 Realising that the amnesty law could 
not be nullified, President Aylwin “turned to a policy of investigating and establishing the 
truth about the past.”155  
 
In the most important initiative of the new government,156 President Aylwin established a 
National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation.157 Article One of the Decree Establishing 
the National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation158 stated that the Commission was 
created for the purpose of clarifying “in a comprehensive manner the truth about the most 
serious human rights violations committed” during the time of the military rule “in order to 
bring about the reconciliation of all Chileans.” 
 
The mandate of the Commission included establishing a complete picture of the grave acts;159 
gathering evidence making it possible to identify victims individually and determining their 
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whereabouts and fate;160 to recommend measures of reparations;161 and to recommend legal 
and administrative measures that should be adopted in order to prevent violations from been 
committed again.162 The mandate excluded abuses that did not result in deaths or 
disappearances, such as torture not resulting in death.163 The reason for this restriction was 
because deaths and disappearances were considered serious crimes.164 This decision was 
criticised by human rights organisations.165 In my view, this decision deserves criticism 
because under the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment,166 torture is considered a “serious crime”. 
 
A “well-balanced” commission was appointed and was headed by Senator Raul Rettig.167 The 
Commission worked for nine months.168 It investigated 3 400 cases, of which it determined 
that 2 920 fitted within its mandate.169 The Commission thoroughly investigated each case.170 
It was assisted in its investigations by being given detailed records of a majority of cases of 
disappearances that were taken to court during the military rule171 and by making use of 
documents and files of domestic and international human rights groups.172 The Commission 
also took testimony from the family of the disappeared or killed.173 In addition, the 
Commission even went as far as placing advertisements in newspapers across the world 
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requesting information from exiles.174 The Commission however received a little co-
operation from the armed forces.175  
 
In addition, the Commission had no powers to issue subpoenas or search warrants and it also 
did not hold any public hearings.176  
 
The Commission produced the so called Rettig Report in February 1991.177 According to the 
report, 95 percent of the human rights abuses, according to the Commission’s definition, were 
caused by State agents178 and four percent of human rights abuses were caused by the 
opposition groups.179 However, it must be noted that the Commission could not determine the 
fate or whereabouts of most victims but it was to be assumed that those who had disappeared 
had been killed.180 According to Sutil, this is related to the controversy surrounding the 
amnesty law181. Sutil states that amnesty affects the public disclosure of truth, which is a 
battle that is centred on the fate and whereabouts of the victims of the military regime.182  
 
The report also failed to name publically the persons appeared to be responsible for human 
rights abuses.183 This decision was made because the Commission felt it would be equivalent 
to bringing criminal charges, which was beyond its competence.184 This would have 
constituted a violation of due process.185 This was a flaw of the Commission because it chose 
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not to comply fully with its mandate “to place all information regarding crimes, including the 
names of the perpetrators before competent courts.”186 Instead, as Mera puts it, it selected 
information it sent to the courts and which it considered relevant for judicial proceedings.187  
Despite the amnesty, the Commission was required to send to the courts any information it 
uncovered involving a crime.188  
 
The report also contained recommendations for reparations for past violations which included 
moral and material compensation.189  
 
On presenting the report to the public, President Aylwin made a formal apology to the 
victims and their families on behalf of the government and also asked the army to 
acknowledge their role in the violence.190 
 
The report was received with praise from the public and human rights groups.191 However, in 
the three weeks after the release of the report there were three assassinations in Chile that 
caused alarm in political circles.192 This resulted in attention being shifted away from the 
report and “plans for social reconciliation exercises” dropped.193  
 
Despite the limited attention given to the report,194 many of its recommendations were 
implemented.195 The most important recommendation that the government followed was 
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establishing a “National Corporation for Reparation and Reconciliation.”196 The Corporation 
was established to search for the remains of the disappeared, resolve cases still left open, 
organise the files of the Commission so that they are made available to the public, and 
implement a reparations program.197 The reparations included cash payments to families of 
the disappeared,198 educational and medical benefits and a pension for the survivors of the 
disappeared or killed.199 Families of the disappeared have accepted these benefits.200 
However, other families were of the opinion that the benefits represent recognition from the 
state of its own guilt for crimes they committed.201 
 
Although limited in its mandate, this truth commission has been considered to be one of the 
most successful in dealing with gross human rights abuses.202 Regardless of the fact that the 
Commission only investigated a limited number of cases and dealt with limited types of 
crimes, its commitment to investigate each case thoroughly has to be applauded.  Given its 
mandate, the Commission struck a good balance between its investigations, findings and 
recommendations.  
 
The Commission may have failed in not being able to fully reconcile the country due to the 
sudden assassinations after the release of the report, but this was through no fault of the 
Commission. The Commission did what it was required in terms of its mandate. Regarding 
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the amnesty, the situation dramatically changed in 1999 when the Chilean Supreme Court 
held that the amnesty could no longer be applied to cases involving the disappeared.203  
 
Mera states that the government was over cautious and could have done more without 
jeopardising the transition to democracy.204 This may be the case, but I disagree on the basis 
that it would have been a huge risk, considering that the army was still intact. President 
Aylwin also possibly did not want to violate the amnesty laws enacted by the Pinochet 
regime in 1980 – enactments designed to ensure his continued role of the army.205   
 
The fact that nobody has since challenged the findings of the report would presumably be 
interpreted to mean that the report may be considered an “authoritative and commonly 
accepted version of the facts.”206 The report also helped diminish the sense of impunity that 
was associated with the crimes committed under the Chilean dictatorship.207 In addition, 
today, much progress has been made in Chile, not only in uncovering the truth about what 
had happened during the dictatorship, but also in the dispensing of justice.208 This attributes 
to the success of the Commission.  
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5.3 EL SALVADOR - Commission of Truth for El Salvador 
 
During the 1980’s, El Salvador was ravaged by a civil war between the Salvadoran military 
and “the most effective guerrilla movement on the continent,” the Farabundo Marti National 
Liberation Front (FMLN).209 The Salvadoran military and its allies waged an attack on the 
rebels and anyone else thought to be associated with.210 At the beginning of the war, the 
military massacred thousands of peasants as part of a strategy to terrorise the peasant 
population in the guerrilla areas and to eliminate the sources of supply and information to the 
guerrillas.211 The rebels retaliated through tactics such as executing civilians considered 
opponents.212 The war which began in 1980 and ended in 1991, resulted in thousands of 
political killings and disappearances.213 One of the prominent cases was the killings of six 
Jesuit priests in 1989 which triggered international pressure to end the war.214 With the aid of 
the United States, the war ended in 1991 with a “United Nations-brokered peace accord”215 
which was reached by way of a negotiated agreement between “an undefeated military and 
undefeated insurgency.”216 
 
One issue the peace accord addressed and the parties agreed to, was that steps be taken to 
improve respect and guarantees for human rights in the future.217 In order to address the past 
violations, the peace accords established two mechanisms.218 These mechanisms included the 
Ad Hoc Commission, designed to purge the military; and the Truth Commission, which 
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examined the most serious ‘acts of violence’ committed during the war.219 The truth 
commission was known as the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador.220 Unable to agree 
to a list of cases that should be investigated, the parties to the accord indicated that it would 
only investigate ‘serious acts of violence’ that had occurred during the war.221 The parties 
also recognised that there was a need to make the complete truth known.222  
 
The Commission was given broad powers to carry out its mandate.223 According to the 
Mexican Agreements, the Commission, apart from investigating “serious acts of violence that 
occurred since 1982 and whose impact on society urgently demanded that the public should 
know the truth,”224 was also charged with making recommendations regarding legal, political, 
or administrative measures based on the results of the investigations.225  
 
In its investigations, the Commission received information from more than 2 000 people 
regarding violations involving more than 7 000 victims.226 The Commission interviewed 
hundreds of witnesses and individuals who had information about certain cases.227 These 
included victims, military members, FMLN members, lawyers, court personnel, and even 
government officials.228 The Commission also collected information from international and 
national human rights groups, Salvadoran institutions and foreign governments.229 The 
Commission even went as far as bringing in the Argentine Forensic Anthropology Team to 
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exhume the remains of a massacre in a town that was the centre of international 
controversy.230  
 
The publication of the Commission’s report was considered a “major political event in El 
Salvador”.231 The report was well received by human rights groups in El Salvador.232 
However, the government and military were not that impressed.233 The Commission claimed 
that five percent of the cases were attributed to the FMLN whereas over 85 percent were 
attributed to government forces.234 The Commission also assigned individual responsibility 
for the violations.235 Hence, it named over forty senior members of the military, judiciary and 
armed opposition for their role in the violence.236 The Commission stressed that “the 
responsibility should not fall on the institutions but on those who committed the violent acts 
and who took steps to cover up the criminal deeds.”237 
 
The Commission was criticised for failing to report on the operation of death squads and the 
role of the United States in supporting government forces.238 In addition, the Commission 
failed to recommend prosecutions. This was blamed on the fact that the existing judiciary was 
too unreliable, weak and compromised to be able to adjudicate cases involving past, gross 
human rights violations.239 The Commission did make it clear however that persons 
responsible for human rights violations should be prosecuted and punished.240 
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Five days after the release of the report, a general amnesty law was passed.241 The amnesty 
law provided for the “extinction” of civil and criminal responsibility.242  
 
Certain recommendations were implemented over time, particularly in the area of judicial 
reform.243 The Commission’s condemnation of the judicial system, including the new 
mechanisms for electing justices which was established in the Peace Accords, led to efforts to 
appoint respected lawyers, the majority of whom were not connected with or affiliated to any 
political party.244  
 
 No steps have been taken to implement the Commission’s recommendations to create a 
compensation fund for victims.245 Nor has the government made any effort to rehabilitate 
victims or provide moral compensation.246  
It is very hard to determine to what extent this truth commission succeeded in dealing with 
gross human rights abuses. The fact that the Commission was only granted eight months to 
undertake all its investigations and submit a report247 makes it impossible to believe that it 
did its work thoroughly. Regardless of the fact that the report was well received, there is no 
balance between the investigations conducted, the general amnesty, the lack of prosecutions 
and the lack of any form of compensation. When determining if a truth commission 
succeeded in dealing with gross human rights abuses, one has to look at the commission and 
circumstances surrounding it objectively, but also subjectively as a victim. And as a victim, 
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the human rights abuses were only investigated and not really “dealt with”. There was no real 
form of justice for victims.   
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5.4 SOUTH AFRICA - Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
 
Apartheid was a system of minority domination of “statutorily defined colour groups on a 
territorial, residential, political, social and economic basis” which was entrenched for nearly 
50 years248 in South Africa. During this time, the country “suffered massacres, torture, 
killings, lengthy imprisonment of activists and severe economic and social discrimination 
against its majority non-white population.”249   
 
The transition from “oppression, exclusivity and resistance to a new negotiated, democratic 
order” was realised in 1994250 when Nelson Mandela was elected president of the new 
government.251 With the transition, there was a need to restore moral order.252   
 
South Africa was left to determine how it would deal with past violations of human rights.253 
The decision was to introduce a truth commission that would offer some form of truth for 
victims, “the restoration of dignity for victims and survivors, a limited amnesty and a search 
for healing and reconciliation.”254 Consequently, after many negotiations, the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was created.255  
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The TRC was established by way of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 
34 of 1995 (the Act).256 The Act presented the TRC with the most “complex and 
sophisticated mandate” for any truth commission.257 The Act also provided “carefully 
balanced powers and an extensive investigatory reach.”258  The TRC had powers to subpoena, 
search and seizure.259  It also had the ability hold public hearings,260 to run a sophisticated 
witness protection program, but most importantly, had the power to grant individual 
amnesty.261 The commission also had a staff of 300 and according to Hayner, it “dwarfed 
previous truth commissions in its size and reach.”262 
 
The objective of the TRC was to establish the causes, nature and extent of violations of gross 
human rights violations committed from 1 March 1960 to May 1994.263 It aimed to establish 
the circumstances, factors and the context of the violations as well as the perspectives of the 
victims and perpetrators, by conducting investigations and holding hearings.264 It also had to 
establish and make known the whereabouts of victims, restore the civil rights and dignity of 
those who survived by granting them an opportunity to express the violations they suffered 
and recommend reparation measures.265  
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The Act provided for three specialised committees operating under the TRC.266 These were 
the Human Rights Committee, the Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee and the 
Amnesty Committee.267 
 
The Human Rights Committee was responsible for collecting statements from victims and 
witnesses and to record the extent of gross human rights violations.268 The Reparation and 
Rehabilitation Committee was charged with designing and making recommendations for a 
reparations policy.269 The Amnesty Committee was responsible for processing and deciding 
on applications made for amnesty.270   
 
The TRC received testimony from over 21 000 victims and witnesses, and 2 000 of them 
appeared in public hearings.271 Special hearings focusing on the religious community, the 
legal community, the health sector, the media, prisons and the armed forces were also held.272  
 
The most controversial power granted to the TRC was the granting of individual amnesty for 
politically motivated crimes committed between 1960 and 1994.273 A total of 7 116 
individuals applied for amnesty, but only 1 167 were granted amnesty.274 Amnesty was 
granted only to those perpetrators who fully disclosed their “involvement in past crimes and 
showed them to be politically motivated.”275  Thus, crimes committed for personal gain or out 
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of malice were not eligible for amnesty.276  In the hearings involving amnesty applicants, 
testimony was given about “how the operations were planned, why certain targets were 
chosen, what forms of brutality and torture victims suffered before they were killed” and who 
in the line of command, gave orders.277 This, in my opinion, is the absolute advantage 
offering amnesty for truth. 
 
It was hoped that early trials would increase the threat of prosecution.278 But when the 
important trial involving Magnus Malan (the former Minister of Defence) and others ended in 
acquittal, it became clear that other “senior-level perpetrators” would not be persuaded by the 
threat of prosecution and apply for amnesty.279 The commission also attempted all sorts of 
methods to lure perpetrators to apply for amnesty. One method aimed at increasing pressure 
on perpetrators to apply for amnesty, was for the Commission to hold certain investigative 
hearings behind closed doors, keeping secret the names mentioned and the crimes committed, 
this was intended to make perpetrators fear that they would be implicated in these hearings.280  
However, many perpetrators did not apply for amnesty.281  
 
The issue concerning the granting of amnesty was severely criticised, and there were those 
who felt so strongly about this matter, that a case challenging the constitutionality of it was 
brought against the TRC in the Constitutional Court of South Africa.282 This was the case of 
Azanian Peoples Organisation et al v President of the Republic of South Africa et al,283 in 
which the court held that “the amnesty provisions were not inconsistent with international 
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norms and that it did not breach South Africa’s obligations in terms of public international 
law instruments.”284 
 
The TRC was mandated by the enabling law, to compile a report which recommended 
detailed measures that needed to be implemented to prevent future human rights abuses.285 In 
October 1998, the TRC issued a five volume report.286  It sparked controversy concerning the 
persons named in it and the role attributed to the African National Congress.287  The TRC 
named the former President of South Africa, P.W Botha and Winnie Madikizela Mandela, 
former spouse of Nelson Mandela, as persons who condoned, encouraged or committed gross 
human rights violations.288  
 
The TRC made comprehensive recommendations for a reparations program, which included 
financial compensation and community recommendations,289 such as the renaming of streets 
or community facilities290. It also envisaged symbolic acts such as the building of 
monuments.291 However, from an international human rights perspective, these reparations do 
not constitute an effective remedy or a sufficient remedy for Apartheid victims.292 From an 
international human rights perspective, the aim of reparation is to eliminate, as far as 
possible, the consequences of the illegal act and to restore the situation that would have 
existed if the act had not been committed.293 In my view, the reparations recommended by 
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any truth commission cannot possibly eliminate “as far as possible” the consequences of 
illegal acts.  
 
In terms of its reparations policy, the Commission announced that $600 million would be 
designated for “direct financial reparations.”294 It also proposed that each victim, or family of 
persons killed, would receive $3 500 each year for six years.295  
 
The work of the TRC was followed by the implementation of a reparations programme 
although, it must be pointed out, minimal funds were available.296 The reparations program 
fell short due to administrative difficulties and because government was unable to allocate the 
required funds for the financial payments.297 According to Hayner, it is a sad irony that a new 
democratic government must pay for the abuses of the prior government.298  I completely 
agree with her.  
 
In its Final Report, the TRC recommended that “where amnesty has been denied, prosecution 
should be considered wherever evidence exists that an individual has committed a gross 
human rights violation.”299 The prosecution of those perpetrators who had been denied 
amnesty or had not applied for it only occurred in very few cases.300 According to Fernandez, 
the principal obstacles to the prosecutions were the tensions that existed between the 
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prosecuting authority and the police investigating team and the lack of resources in the 
prosecution service.301  
 
However, after receiving the TRC’s report, the President mandated the National Director of 
Public Prosecutions to institute proceedings from the findings of the TRC.302 In March 2003, 
the Priority Crimes Litigation Unit was created with the function of prosecuting persons 
refused amnesty by the TRC.303 Although, the accepted prosecution guidelines entailed that 
only serious human rights violations be prosecuted where the evidence is reliable, and that 
“humanitarian considerations” and the “interests of reconciliation” should be considered in 
decision making.304  
 
The South African truth and reconciliation process is based on the idea that by revealing the 
truth about what happened to the victims of gross human rights abuses, such as the persons 
who were tortured or killed or disappeared, the nation would become more amenable to 
reconciliation.305 It would be naive to believe that “actual” reconciliation was achieved 
considering the lack of prosecutions and reparations programs. However, it is submitted that 
the TRC succeeded in “promoting” the reconciliation it set out to achieve regardless of the 
lack of proper reparations programs or prosecutions. It contributed to “promote” 
reconciliation by bringing forth truths that were unknown, and to some victims, this may have 
been enough. In my view, truth goes hand in hand with reconciliation. Even if the whole truth 
was not known, it brought certain victims closure. And this is a step to reconciliation.  
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According to Boraine, there was an “accumulation” of knowledge, and also an 
acknowledgment of Apartheid.306 It should also be kept in mind that the lack of prosecutions 
and reparations was the fault of the government and not the TRC.  
 
However, the granting of amnesty is controversial because it takes away the fundamental 
right of a victim to seek redress from a court.307 And by granting amnesty for crimes 
considered crimes under international law, the rule under international humanitarian law, that 
no amnesty may be granted for these crimes, is violated.308 In addition, few perpetrators came 
forward and there was no sincere apology for their crimes committed.309 Many were of the 
view that due to these deficiencies, the TRC worked in favour of the perpetrators and not the 
victims.310 In addition, the granting of amnesty immunised perpetrators from both criminal 
and civil liability.311 This prompted the filing of reparations proceedings by victims of 
apartheid, in the United States under the Alien Torts Claims Act.312  
 
However, the idea of “truth-for-amnesty” was plausible. This idea was a compromise for a 
country that dealt with mass human rights violations and especially for a country that is 
unable to afford costly trials. I agree with Boraine that the truth revealed offered not only 
peace of mind, but also a limited form of justice.313 According to Werle, with whom I also 
agree, the reason why the TRC was successful was because it was all about “truth” and truth 
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has precedence over punishment and also over amnesty.314 The amnesty was the price that 
South Africa had to pay for a “relatively peaceful transition.”315  
 
The TRC dealt with the perpetrators without vengeance. It carried out its mandate and 
performed its duties as was required by the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation 
Act. In my opinion, the TRC was not entirely successful in dealing with gross human rights 
violations. It could have made more substantial recommendations such as having perpetrators 
apologise or recommending perpetrators carry out community service.  
 
But it must be noted that reconciliation is not automatic. The TRC may not have succeeded in 
dealing with gross human rights violations, but it succeeded in its “commitment.”316 Boraine 
states that despite the restraints of a negotiated settlement and major compromises between 
blanket amnesties and Nuremberg style prosecutions, the TRC achieved the best possible 
outcome by taking the route it did.317 The TRC contributed to the growing popularity of truth 
commissions across the world.318 It is in my view the ultimate model to “learn” from, not 
only from its originality, but also from its mistakes. 
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5.5 GUATEMALA - Commission for the Historical Clarification 
 
The civil war between the “anticommunist government forces and the leftist Unidad 
Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG)” in Guatemala lasted over thirty years and 
led to the death and disappearances of about 200 000 people.319  This war continued into the 
1990’s until it was put to an end by “United Nations moderations.”320 During negotiations of 
a peace agreement, it had to be determined how past abuses would be addressed.321 There 
was an agreement to establish the Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clarification 
(CEH322).323 The CEH was a peace settlement between the Government and the URNG by 
virtue of the “Oslo Agreement” of June 1994.324 This settlement provided that the CEH was 
required to “clarify the human rights violations and acts of violence committed during the 
armed confrontation that affected Guatemala for thirty five years.”325  
 
The CEH was made up two Guatemalans and was headed by a German law professor, 
Christian Tomuschat, a German law professor.326  The reason for this type of mixed 
commission was because the negotiating parties believed that an element of impartiality and 
independence was needed “to shield the CEH from any suspicion of bias.”327  
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The mandate of the CEH was defined in very broad terms.328 The CEH had the task of 
clarifying human rights violations and acts of violations that occurred during the armed 
conflict.329 The CEH would have to explain the results of its investigations in a report 
addressing internal and external factors.330 In addition, the CEH had to formulate 
recommendations designed to promote peace and harmony in Guatemala.331   
 
During its investigations the CEH gave priority to attacks on life and personal integrity such 
as extrajudicial executions, forced disappearances and sexual violence.332 This did not 
however entail that other violations were totally excluded.333 One of the objectives of the 
CEH was to ensure that the past would never repeat itself.334  
 
According to the agreement on the establishment of the Commission to clarify past human 
rights violations and acts of violence that have caused the Guatemalan population to suffer,335 
the Commission also had to receive particulars and information from individuals or 
institutions that considered themselves to be affected.336 In addition, “a formal pledge” had 
been made in Guatemala that everyone would enjoy an opportunity to go to the CEH and 
inform it about his or her personal experiences.337 In turn, and after hesitation, the Mayan 
population made use of the chance to bring to public knowledge the suffering they endured 
and were subjected to.338   
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A controversial issue of the CEH was its prohibition against assigning individual 
responsibility.339 Human rights organisations believed that a report was only useful if it 
named the perpetrators of the crimes.340 This was one of the major reasons why the Catholic 
Church in Guatemala decided to create its own truth commission.341  
 
The CEH had no search, subpoena or seizure powers.342 It also provided no amnesty 
incentive.343 The perpetrators could thus only rely on not being named in the report.344 In 
addition, the hearings of witnesses were held in private, which in this case, provided 
assurance to the witnesses that their identity would be protected, thus shielding them from 
potential retaliatory attacks on the part of the Armed Forces, for example.345  
 
In terms of its investigations, the CEH failed to receive any substantial response to its 
requests for information from the Guatemalan armed forces and government.346 According to 
Tomuschat, the contribution made by the Government of Guatemala for clarification could be 
characterised as next to nothing.347  The co-operation by the URNG was more productive 
with the CEH.348 The URNG acknowledged responsibility in certain incidents and therefore 
took significant steps to comply with their duties under the agreement decided in Oslo.349 The 
CEH also incorporated the data from two non-governmental organisations.350 These were the 
Recovery of Historical Memory Project of the Catholic Church’s Human Rights Office and 
                                                            
339 Ibid 243. 
340 Ibid. 
341 Ibid.  
342 Ibid 246. 
343 Ibid. 
344 Ibid. 
345 Ibid 247.  
346 Ibid 249. 
347 Ibid 250. 
348 Ibid 252. 
349 Ibid. 
350 Hayner Unspeakable Truths op cit 47. 
 
 
 
 
48 
 
the Centro Internacional para Investigaciones en Derechos Humanos, which collected 
thousands of statements from victims and their families.351 The CEH used the data of these 
organisations to help estimate the total number of people killed or disappeared.352  
 
The CEH eventually submitted its report to the Government of Guatemala and the former 
URNG in February 1999.353  The report described acts of extreme cruelty354 and stated that 
genocide had been perpetrated “at certain times in certain places during the civil war.”355 The 
report documented 23 000 killings, 6 000 disappearances and 626 massacres.356  Although the 
commission was unable to name the perpetrators, it did state that most of the human rights 
violations that occurred were known to the regime or carried out pursuant to its orders.357  
Human rights organisations were satisfied with the report and everyone agreed that all 
expectations had been exceeded.358  
 
It must be noted that the CEH was very much involved with the nation at large. Whilst 
preparing its recommendations, the CEH convened a forum giving interested parties an 
opportunity to “give their view as to the desirable contents of the recommendations.”359  
 
The CEH recommended that a National Reparations Program be created to provide moral and 
material reparations.360 The recommendations in the report included that the former president 
apologise in public, as a moral gesture, and take responsibility for the human rights abuses 
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connected with the armed confrontation.361 This was rejected.362 In addition, no consequences 
resulted from the finding that genocide had been committed.363 In terms of the 
recommendations made in the report, the newly elected president stated in his inaugural 
speech that he was committed to implementing the Commission’s recommendations.364  
However, human rights organizations observed that no element of the recommendations had 
been put into practice.365 Nor did the public prosecutor’s office take active steps to institute 
proceedings.366 The government also showed no interest in implementing the 
recommendations.367 Whether the CEH laid a foundation for national reconciliation is also 
unclear.368 
 
It is submitted that the CEH carried out its mandate successfully. However, this does not 
mean that it dealt with gross human rights abuses successfully. The CEH’s mandate was 
limited, and by not acknowledging in the report at least the perpetrators of the abuses, it could 
hardly deserve the appellation “truth” commission. Even though it would have been 
impossible to name all the perpetrators,369 some names could have been reported so as to 
actually “clarify” the human rights violations. According to Tomuschat, arrangements were 
agreed upon that certain perpetrators would be indicted, but this never happened.370 The 
Commission also offered no amnesty, which meant that only victims would come forward to 
give testimony and not perpetrators. Thus, the victims did not receive any form of “real” truth 
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or any form of justice or reparations. Regardless of the fact that it may have clarified past 
abuses and acts of violence and that it did deliver a detailed report, it does not according to 
the international notion of a truth commission, depict the entire truth.  
The Guatemalan model is another classic case of their being a “lack of political will” on 
behalf of the government371.  
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5.6 SIERRA LEONE - Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
 
The civil war in Sierra Leone was begun in March 1991 by armed forces known as the 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF), led by Foday Kankoh, when they entered Sierra Leone 
from Liberia.372 The RUF declared that their objective was to overthrow the government of 
Joseph Saidu and the All People’s Congress.373 The events that day were regarded as “the 
beginning of a decade of violence that devastated the country.”374 During the war that 
followed, the RUF, its allies and opponents, resorted to methods of the “utmost brutality.”375  
The war was notorious for the mutilation of civilians by mainly RUF forces.376  
 
The nine-year civil war ended with the signing of the Lome Peace Agreement (hereafter the 
Lome Agreement) in 1999377 by the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF.378 The Lome 
Agreement granted a sweeping amnesty to all combatants for all crimes committed during the 
war.379 This was criticised by national and international human rights groups.380 The Special 
Representative to the Secretary-General of the United Nations made a reservation to the 
amnesty provision on the grounds that it could not apply to international crimes.381 Due to 
national and international pressures exerted for some form of accountability for the crimes 
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committed during the conflict,382 the Lome Agreement called for the establishment of a Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission.383  
 
According to Section 6(1) of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000 (TRC Act), 
the Commission was established “to create an impartial historical record of violations and 
abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law related to the armed conflict in 
Sierra Leone, from the beginning of the Conflict in 1991 to the signing of signing of the 
Lome Peace Agreement; to address impunity, to respond to the needs of the victims, to 
promote healing and reconciliation and to prevent a repetition of the violations and abuses 
suffered”.  The Commission also had powers to search,384 seize385 and subpoena386 and also 
to request and receive police assistance as needed for its investigations.387  
 
In terms of its investigatory functions, the Commission was charged with investigating and 
reporting on the nature and extent of the violations and also to investigate and report on the 
antecedents of the conflict.388 This indicated that there was no “precise” temporal framework 
in the mandate because “antecedent” implied that the Commission could “look well back 
from 1991.”389 The Commission also had to provide the victims with an opportunity to talk 
about their violations suffered and perpetrators an opportunity to relate their experiences so 
as to help restore the human dignity of the victims and to promote reconciliation.390 In 
addition, the Commission had to give special attention to children and victims of sexual 
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abuses.391 The Commission was also charged with determining which parties were 
responsible for violations.392 The core of the Commission’s mandate was the concept of 
“human rights violations and abuses” and the TRC Act suggested that this could be 
committed by both individuals and governments.393 The Commission not only considered 
civil and political rights, but also economic, social and cultural rights.394  
 
The work of the Commission consisted of two phases.395 The first phase was called the 
“statement taking phase.”396 This phase lasted three months and approximately 7 000 
statements from victims and a few perpetrators were collected.397 Particular attention had to 
be given to the taking of statements by women.398 The second phase, known as the “hearings 
phase”, began a month after the statement taking phase and lasted approximately five 
months.399 These hearings, which brought together victims and perpetrators, were held 
throughout the country.400 Hearings were also held on thematic issues such as the media, 
corruption, governance and the legal profession.401 The actual operations of the Commission 
took about eight months.402  
 
The final report was presented in 2004403 after being drafted for more than a year.404 It 
elaborated on the causes of the conflict405 which, according to Schabas, had conflicting 
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versions,406 and it also discussed the history of Sierra Leone in detail.407 The report also made 
extensive recommendations on how the root causes of the conflict be tackled.408 The report 
called for the abolition of the death penalty and the release of illegally detained persons.409  
 
The Commission recommended services such as healthcare, education and access to 
microcredit and also called for a “robust program of compensation to victims,” but it was 
unclear as to how these reparatory measures would be funded.410  
 
In the report, the Commission discussed the amnesty provision and stated that it is unable to 
condemn the amnesty and to declare that the amnesty was “too high a price to pay for the 
delivery of peace to Sierra Leone.”411  
 
In June 2000, President Kabbah withdrew the amnesty partially412 and called upon the United 
Nations to assist in prosecuting those who committed atrocities.413 In 2002, the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone, which was a treaty-based international institution, began its work.414  
The parallel existence of the Commission and the Special Court was one of the most 
distinctive aspects of the Sierra Leone model.415  After resistance to the idea of working 
together, the Special Court’s prosecutor and the Chairman of the Commission said publicly 
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that they would work in mutual support of each other.416 Thus, the two institutions operated 
“contemporaneously.”417  
 
The circumstances eventually brought about the trials of certain well-known perpetrators.418 
And in March 2004, the Special Court of Sierra Leone declared the amnesty was in breach of 
international law.419 
 
The approach taken by Sierra Leone may have had its difficulties and complexities but it also 
showed the possibility that an international court and a truth commission can operate 
simultaneously.420 However, even though the Commission successfully fulfilled its mandate 
and the Special Court prosecuted certain individuals, this truth commission did not 
successfully deal with gross human rights violations. This submission is based on the 
amnesty agreed to in the Lome Agreement which still barred the prosecution of certain 
perpetrators. It is also based on the complexity surrounding the creation of the Special Court. 
The fact that the Special Court was not part of the Lome Agreement initially, means that the 
Lome Agreement was to benefit only the perpetrators. Despite a detailed report, the victims’ 
rights to truth and reparations were not sufficiently addressed421 by the Commission itself 
which means that in this case, the victims were rewarded with nothing. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
6 Findings and Recommendations  
 
6.1 Findings 
Five of the above truth commissions are the most significant truth commissions to date.422  
These commissions are significant in their size, impact and the attention it received in their 
respective countries and across the world.423 Sierra Leone, a more recent truth commission, is 
important as well because it illustrates a truth commission working almost parallel to an 
international court.  Therefore, truth commissions may complement and not replace other 
forms of mechanisms to deal with the past.  
 
Despite the limitations experienced, “the process and the product” 424 of the above truth 
commissions illustrated the significant contribution that was provided in fundamentally 
changing how the country understood and accepted some of the controversial aspects of its 
past.425 Where the commissions have completed remarkable work despite “political or 
financial restraints”426, there has been a lack of commitment on part of the governments to 
implement the recommendations.  This is erroneously regarded the greatest failing of truth 
commissions. It must be noted that this is not the failure of the truth commission but of their 
respective government. 
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In my view, the Chilean and South African TRC’s are the most significant truth commissions 
to date. The approach adopted by these TRC’s was the middle road of two extremes of 
Nuremberg style prosecutions and blanket amnesties. According to Heine, both countries 
today “are among the most politically stable and economically prosperous”.427 They are the 
truth commissions that have paved the way of the future and that future truth commissions 
may learn from.  
 
Thus, truth commissions are effective and on a whole, may be successful in dealing with 
gross human rights violations, if correctly implemented and executed. Even when 
unsuccessful, truth commissions have the ability to succeed and therefore, remain in my 
opinion, the most important mechanism to deal with grave breaches of human rights.  
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6.2 Recommendations 
In my view, it cannot be accurately determined as to how successful truth commissions are. 
Each truth commission has its problems. However, truth commissions may be more effective 
if the following recommendations were to be considered: 
  
• The mandates of the truth commissions should be broad enough to include powers of 
subpoena, search and seizure. It should also be sufficiently broad to allow 
investigation into all forms of human rights abuses.428 
• Victims should be the focus. 
• Public hearings must be held. Private hearings may only be held in situations where 
the victim fears for his or her safety. An advantage of this may be that the testimonies 
cannot be edited by the commission.  
• Testimony must be given under oath.  
• The final report must be presented to the public. 
• Prosecuting senior-level perpetrators. This is important and useful even if it is 
impossible to prosecute all persons responsible.  
• Amnesty is possible and could be made available in peace agreements. This is 
provided that full disclosure is made and that the amnesty does not extend to those 
who committed serious international crimes.  
• All persons responsible for committing gross human rights violations must be named. 
This includes those persons granted amnesty.  
• The names of those persons responsible, which were not granted an amnesty, must be 
forwarded to the prosecuting authorities if sufficient evidence is available.   
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• If an agreement exists between the old regime and new government that no persons 
from the prior regime will be prosecuted, the new government must introduce 
measures of lustration. Lustration should also take place where there has been limited 
or no prosecutions. This may satisfy some victims as a form of punishment. It may 
also assist in preventing past abuses from recurring.  
• Formal apologies must be given by senior officials of the old regime. 
• If no prosecutions are recommended, or in the absence of prosecutions, the 
Commission must recommend that perpetrators must be given community service. 
• The commission must also contribute by addressing issues of gender and woman 
empowerment.429 This must be done where there have been cases of sexual violence.  
• Apart from recommending reparation programs, the government should also establish 
a reparations fund to which perpetrators and beneficiaries of the old regime may 
contribute.430  
• If there is a lack of resources available to establish a reparations program, other forms 
of compensation must be made available. This may be done by building monuments 
or memorial plaques and providing national holidays in memory of the past and its 
victims. 
• The peace agreement or negotiations concerning the establishment of a truth 
commission must include that the implementation of the truth commission’s 
recommendations is mandatory.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
7. Conclusion 
Truth commissions are in favour with the international human rights community for ending 
civil conflict.431  In addition, international human rights instruments also assist in guiding 
successor regimes to deal with prior regimes who committed gross human rights violations.  
 
According to the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation 
for Victims of Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law,432 remedies 
for the violations of international human rights law includes the victims right to access 
justice, reparation for harm suffered and accessing the factual information concerning the 
violation.433  
 
In addition, establishing the truth about the past is necessary to begin the healing process of 
victims and society as a whole.434 Only when the truth is found, can it be determined if a 
society can reconcile. This depends on the execution of the truth commission. And even 
though truth commissions do not have judicial powers to dispense punishment, “it has the 
moral power to pass judgment.”435 Truth commissions encompass a combination of elements 
of the various other mechanisms available to countries in transition and therefore, if correctly 
executed, truth commissions are and can be successful in dealing with gross human rights 
                                                            
431 Brahm op cit. 
432 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Violations of 
International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (revised) UN Document E/CN.4/2005/59 UN Commission 
on Human Rights. See also Mani op cit 38. 
433 Ibid.  
434 Fernandez, L “Possibilities and limitations of reparations for the victims of human rights violations in South 
Africa” in Confronting Past Injustices in Rwelamira, M and Werle, G (eds) (2006) 78. 
435 Zalaquett, J “Institutional Design and Processes of Truth Commissions” in An Interdisciplinary Discussion 
held at Harvard Law School in May 1996 Harvard Law School Human Rights Program (1996) 60. 
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violations. However, in order to succeed it needs the support from both the political society 
and the civil society.436  
 
Everyone has the right to know what happened in the past. The past must therefore be dealt 
with in a way that contributes to peace. As Dullah Omar stated, “We are not dealing only 
with the past, we are dealing with the future…the way you deal with the past must impact 
upon the shape of the future.”437 
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436 Freeman, M “Truth Commissions – facts and myths” Speech on the Second Regional Forum Establishing the 
Truth about War Crimes and Conflicts Zagreb, Croatia February 2007 Available at http://www.hlc-
rdc.org/uploads/editor/Truth%20Commission-facts%20and%20myths-Mark%20Freeman-ff(1).pdf (Accessed 
on 22 September 2009). 
 
437 Omar, A in Rwelamira, M and Werle, G (eds) Confronting Past Injustices (2006) ix. 
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